Date Written: June 19th, 2015
For: GCU ADM 614
Regulating
Nuclear Waste: The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Growth In Spite of Concerns
Following the nuclear arms race and
the development of atomic warfare, the United States was looking for a way in
which to safely dispose of the harmful waste, which held radiation levels
harmful to most humans. This waste could
not be disposed of in a traditional dump nor could it be delivered out to sea;
these trepidations lead to the development of a plant, which answered all
concerns about the radioactive waste. This
analysis will strive to further understand the work done by this plant and how
the plant could be affected by regulation on both a private and public level.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the only one of its kind, is an underground limestone depository in Southeastern New Mexico supported by the Department of Energy. It is touted as “the nation's only repository for the disposal of nuclear waste known as transuranic or TRU…[which] consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with small amounts of plutonium and other man-made radioactive elements” (WIPP Update, 2015). While such a plant appears necessary due to the amount of hazardous material produced following the Cold War era, there are still concerns about safety practices as well as incentives within the city of Carlsbad, New Mexico towards WIPP and its subsidiaries.
Originally, the socioeconomic impact of WIPP on New Mexico was touted to be large and hold strong long-term benefits. However, concerns about WIPP and the economy in Carlsbad as well as competition from the oil companies during what is one of the largest oil-boom decades in New Mexico history, show that the impact of WIPP might not be as strong as earlier predicted and partnerships between the Department of Energy, WIPP, and companies such as URS Energy and Construction, Inc. might be receiving benefits beyond those seen by the economy of Southeastern New Mexico. Also, the fact that the Department of Energy allocated a $1.9 million bonus to WIPP as compensation for their excellent progress and safety efforts, only days after an underground fire, raises concerns as to the distribution of funds without proper evaluation of the situations (Villagram, 2014). This incident is one of many that have occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in recent years and by offering incentives for “safety” and not following through with monitoring situations, it does not promise to be the last situation. According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), “the DOE has long escaped outside regulation and public scrutiny under the guise of ‘national security,’ leading to numerous instances of serious safety and health hazards for individuals and communities across the nation” (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, n.d.). This oversight in regulation coupled with concerns over shared ownership beg the question, how far is too far when it comes to a private entity and public entity sharing ownership of a company—especially one with such a volatile and controversial purpose?
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the only one of its kind, is an underground limestone depository in Southeastern New Mexico supported by the Department of Energy. It is touted as “the nation's only repository for the disposal of nuclear waste known as transuranic or TRU…[which] consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with small amounts of plutonium and other man-made radioactive elements” (WIPP Update, 2015). While such a plant appears necessary due to the amount of hazardous material produced following the Cold War era, there are still concerns about safety practices as well as incentives within the city of Carlsbad, New Mexico towards WIPP and its subsidiaries.
Originally, the socioeconomic impact of WIPP on New Mexico was touted to be large and hold strong long-term benefits. However, concerns about WIPP and the economy in Carlsbad as well as competition from the oil companies during what is one of the largest oil-boom decades in New Mexico history, show that the impact of WIPP might not be as strong as earlier predicted and partnerships between the Department of Energy, WIPP, and companies such as URS Energy and Construction, Inc. might be receiving benefits beyond those seen by the economy of Southeastern New Mexico. Also, the fact that the Department of Energy allocated a $1.9 million bonus to WIPP as compensation for their excellent progress and safety efforts, only days after an underground fire, raises concerns as to the distribution of funds without proper evaluation of the situations (Villagram, 2014). This incident is one of many that have occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in recent years and by offering incentives for “safety” and not following through with monitoring situations, it does not promise to be the last situation. According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), “the DOE has long escaped outside regulation and public scrutiny under the guise of ‘national security,’ leading to numerous instances of serious safety and health hazards for individuals and communities across the nation” (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, n.d.). This oversight in regulation coupled with concerns over shared ownership beg the question, how far is too far when it comes to a private entity and public entity sharing ownership of a company—especially one with such a volatile and controversial purpose?
While the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is a
shared entity, they still struggle with the issues of safety as to ability for
privatization. Nuclear waste creates a
multitude of issues that are harder for the government to mitigate as far as
contracts are concerned. If
Westinghouse, Haliburton, or any other partner corporation wanted to take over,
the option would be there, but inherent risks would exist. Privatization of
such a company would lead to increased responsibility for whichever of the
private shareholders chose to take majority.
Any incident with the TRU could lead into bad publicity for the private
owner.
Looking at it from the other perspective, by
turning the property solely under Public domain, the outside contract work that
has lowered costs and provided area economic support could dwindle. Issues with keeping the property rights under
government ownership, according to Holcombe (2006), “is that individuals will consider
the private costs and benefits but will not have the incentive to weigh the
public costs and benefits, which will accrue to the public as a whole” (p. 59). Keeping this in mind, by taking that focus
away from the public, more issues may arise as to the oversight of the
regulation of the plant. Whistleblowers
can be useful to the success of any regulatory plan and utilizing those who
believe their rights are being violated by nuclear waste transport to their
area may serve as better regulation than a private company under government
regulation.
There are numerous concerns over the individual
rights, which can be mitigated with the use of whistleblowers. Those who live in the community or in
surrounding communities through which waste has to be transported have more
power than one might imagine. With cases
of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden becoming everyday news, many people
are on the look out for the next big break.
By regulating on a community level, this plant may be able to survive as
a solely government entity. In turn, it
seems that the Department of Energy might do well under self-regulation. While one outer regulatory agency, the
Environmental Protection Agency might suggest that the plant is reaching high
safety standards, “DOE
and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), a federal oversight
agency--have raised questions about WIPP operations, mainly in regard to worker
safety but also touching on equipment and electrical failures” (Amid other
safety issues, 2010). By noting that the
plant may be putting its employees at risk and if those employees are to voice
their concerns as well, the program might be able to survive as an exclusive
government entity.
Following this analysis, I would suggest a nationalization of
the plant bringing it completely under the public sector. In doing this, the
program would face stronger self-regulation, which in turn would be held to
public standards as stated by the community surrounding the plant. Groups such as the AFSCME and the people of
Carlsbad, New Mexico would participate in regulating the program and therefore
supplement regulatory boards, as the Freedom of Information Act would entitle
them to further information from a public group. The major downfall to this action would be a
decrease in jobs from the private sector companies involved. This could be mitigated through increase
public sector employment opportunities, but their income and output would not
necessarily be the same as private sector careers.
While there is no set answer to the issues involved with the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, understanding the issues that come about through
publicly and privately shared entities are necessary to realize that the
current set up is not working as well as one might hope. By working through the issues and discovering
the root of the problem, it appears that choosing one path might be to the
benefit of W.I.P.P., Carlsbad, the surrounding communities, and the nuclear
waste communities. Until these issues
are resolved, safety bonuses allotted days after fires might continue to be put
out and regulation will continue to suffer in the case of Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant.
References
Adcock, L. (1980,
September). Socioeconomic study for the proposed waste isolation pilot plant. Sandia National Laboratories.
Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl6780966
Amid other safety
issues, EPA recertifies WIPP. (2010). Energy Daily, (225), 4-4.
Retrieved 2015, from
http://library.gcu.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=57234406&site=eds-live&scope=site
Holcombe, R. (2006).
Public sector economics: The role of government in the American economy. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
Villagram, L. (2014,
July 20). WIPP contractor received $1.9M bonus after fire. Albuquerque Journal.
Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://www.abqjournal.com/432263/news/wipp-contractor-received-19m-bonus-after-fire.html
Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP). (n.d.). Retrieved June 11, 2015, from
http://www.afscme.org/members/conventions/resolutions-and-amendments/1992/resolutions/86-waste-isolation-pilot-plant-wipp
WIPP Update. (2015).
Retrieved May 4, 2015, from http://www.wipp.energy.gov/wipprecovery/recovery.html
WRES. (2004). Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant biennial environmental compliance report. Washington
Regulatory and Environmental Services. Doi: 10.2172/925567
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